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INTRODUCTION
In our usual public discourse and debate, the rule of law is a very good
thing, so good that we are committed to exporting it around the world.
By contrast, bureaucracy is very bad—a threat to human freedom and the
ability to thrive. Indeed, one of the distinctively modern themes,
associated with Max Weber and Franz Kafka, describes bureaucracies as
the site of “organizational gothic” where organizations are “‘sites of
darkness’, ‘labyrinths with endless corridors’; and ‘locked doors hiding
evil secrets’ shifting from ‘the dark street’ to ‘the cramped office’ . . . .”1
Given the rule of law’s positive outlook and bureaucracy’s negative
connotation—it would seem to be simple to distinguish a legal order2
from a bureaucracy. But this is not so. Our notions of the rule of law and

* William W. Gurley Memorial Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of
Law. This Essay was based on a talk given by me as an invited speaker at the Loyola University
Chicago Law Journal’s Conference on April 8, 2016. I am grateful to the editors of the Loyola
University Chicago Law Journal and to Professor Barry Sullivan for their kindness and hospitality.
1. Malcolm Warner, Kafka, Weber, and Organizational Theory, 60 HUM. REL. 1019, 1022–23
(2007) (quoting Martin Parker, Organisational Gothic, 11 CULTURE & ORG. 153, 159 (2005)).
2. I avoid the more usual phrase, “legal system,” because the term already shows hints of
bureaucracy.
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bureaucracy are far from univocal—but rather, “essentially contested.”3
Deciphering the distinction between the rule of law and bureaucracy is
not simply a matter of attaining conceptual clarity. One major political
task concerns ascertaining what kinds of institutions and practices are
appropriate to bring good order to the more or less distinct realms of
social life, or what Lon Fuller calls “forms of social order.”4 Where
should we resort to informal bureaucratized psychological pressure
through interrogation, as we do in our criminal justice system 95 percent
of the time? Where should we rely on the instrumental application of
social scientific methods, specifically microeconomic reasoning, as we
mainly do in antitrust law? Where should we rely on the broadly clinical
judgment of administrators “bred to the facts” and committed to the
relatively unconstrained definitions of agency purpose? 5 Where is it
important to strictly follow predictable formalist modes of legal
reasoning, designed to enhance predictability and control official
discretion?6 Where should we provide plenary narrative-dramatic
consideration of a human situation that relativizes “the rule of law as a
law of rules,”7 as we do in the relatively few jury trials we still conduct?8
Some of these approaches can fairly be called bureaucratic, and some
cannot, so it is useful to get a grip on the practical meaning of the terms.
This Essay’s argument proceeds in twelve steps. First, this Essay
describes why (almost) no one wants to belong to a bureaucracy and why
American lawyers would recoil from considering our legal order to be
just another bureaucracy. Second, this Essay provides a classical
understanding of bureaucracy that still has power, as a form of social
ordering that effectively deploys instrumental reason in the service of a
3. Walter Bryce Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167,
169 (1956).
4. Fuller called this question “eunomics.” Lon Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at MidCentury, A Review of Edwin W. Patterson’s Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law, 6 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 457, 476 (1954).
5. “Bred to the facts” is James Landis’s term. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS 39 (Greenwood Press 1938). See infra text accompanying note 21 (discussing Weber’s
acceptance of the “neo-Kantian strict distinction between fact and value”). See generally CHARLES
T. GOODSELL, THE CASE FOR BUREAUCRACY (4th ed. 2015) (advocating the United States
bureaucracy as one of the most effective institutions of any in the world).
6. ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 10–15 (1999); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, THE
RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 96–101 (2004).
7. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187 (1989).
8. ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 113 (2009). There are “relatively
few” trials compared to our own past. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM
AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 251 (BasicBooks 1994). The United States still sees about
150,000 jury trials each year. Id.
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predetermined goal set by a sovereign will. Third, this Essay recounts a
familiar understanding of the relationship between courts and
bureaucracies—in which courts impose rules that constrain the whollyinstrumental pursuit of the sovereign’s goal. Fourth, this Essay puzzles
over the obvious problem for this latter understanding—namely that
bureaucracies can be highly rule-bound without ceasing to be
bureaucracies. Fifth, this Essay concedes that courts might have a
different attitude toward rules than do bureaucracies, but that this
distinction does not necessarily signal a difference in kind. And, sixth,
this Essay notes that post-formalist courts have relaxed that different
attitude to the point where courts begin to look like premodern
bureaucracies. Still, seventh, there are aspects of society’s legal order
that are discontinuous with bureaucratic ordering. Eighth, those nonbureaucratic aspects of our legal order are currently under siege,
something that might simply pose a question of political will or, more
ominously, reflect an inevitable “bureaucratization of the world”9 and the
epochal dominance of instrumental reason in modernity. Ninth, these
residual elements in legal order still allow some judges and juries to
realize the values implicit in society’s deepest convictions—what Paul
Riceour called an ethics already realized—and tenth, allow those decision
makers to make judgments of relative importance among the inevitably
competing values in a world where “justice is conflict.”10 Eleventh, on
the theoretical level, that would suggest an account of the way in which
our trial and appellate procedures actually could provide access to the
valid norms implicit in our common life.11 Twelfth, in our post-modern
world, this theoretical account would probably rely on a kind of realism
in which we know these norms because we are immersed in them through
our practices.
I. SO WHAT IS WRONG WITH BUREAUCRACY?
Weber’s classic account held that “[b]ureaucratic administration
means fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge.
This is the feature of it that makes it specifically rational. This consists

9. See generally HENRY JACOBY, THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WORLD (Eveline L. Kanes
trans., 1973) (showing how the bureaucratic system has permeated society).
10. STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT passim (1999).
11. I am not suggesting that our practices need to await such a theory. Of course, they do not.
On the darker side, I recall Hegel’s warning that a full theoretical elaboration of a form of life
occurs only when the latter is at an end. “The Owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the
falling of the dusk.” GEORG HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 13 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1952) (1896).
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of “technical knowledge which, by itself is sufficient to ensure it a
position of extraordinary power.”12
It is “domination through
knowledge.”
Roberto Unger explains that bureaucratic law becomes possible when
the separation of state and society has already occurred. This allows for
the conviction that “some social relations are and ought to be an object of
human will”13 which partially rejected the earlier and more universal
notion that society is “the expression of an order that men do not and
ought not control.” The commands of a sovereign in a bureaucratic
organization will eventually take the form of general rules, rules that
allow the sovereign and the top bureaucrats greater power over the
decisions of the lower bureaucrats. “But this will simply be a generality
of political experience, a way to get things done more effectively. It may
and will be violated whenever the considerations of administrative
efficiency that led to its adoption point the other way.”14 Unlike formalist
concepts of the rule of law, “there are no commitments to generality in
lawmaking . . . that must be kept regardless of their consequences for the
political interests of the rulers.”15
Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that the contemporary bureaucrat’s
strongest claim to legitimacy stems from his or her claimed ability to
deploy a body of scientific and, above all, social scientific knowledge,
that is at its strongest in the form of law-like generalizations that explain
and predict the future of social life.16 These contemporary bureaucrats
study the work of economists, sociologists, and organizational theorists
that have informed the textbooks studied at the Grand Ecoles, the London
School of Economics, and the Harvard Business School.17 Despite
differences, “in every case the rise of managerial expertise would have to
be the same central theme, and such expertise . . . has two sides to it: there
is the aspiration to value neutrality and the claim to manipulative
12. MAX WEBER: THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 339 (A.M.
Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1947).
13. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF
SOCIAL THEORY 59 (1976). Karl Polanyi’s controversial book, The Great Transformation: The
Political and Economic Origins of our Time, is the classic account of how that conviction allowed
for the imposition of the “utopian” ideal of the self-regulating market on European society. For an
account of its contemporary relevance, see FRED BLOCK & MARGARET R. SOMERS, THE POWER
OF MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM: KARL POLANYI’S CRITIQUE 8 (2014).
14. UNGER, supra note 13, at 67.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre doubts that these law-like generalizations actually exist in
any strong “scientific” sense. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL
THEORY 86 (3rd ed. 2007).
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power.”18
This Weberian identification of bureaucratic ordering with value-free
instrumental power contains the seed of a major criticism of bureaucracy
and of the concern with a legal order that is simply a form of bureaucratic
ordering.19 Weber considered the value-free nature of social science to
be a main virtue, if not a cultural necessity. 20 Because Weber accepted
the neo-Kantian strict distinction between fact and value and assimilated
Nietzsche’s critique of Kantian morality, 21 he could describe the
significance of the physical and social sciences that informed the
bureaucrat’s action using Tolstoi’s simple answer to the question of the
importance of science to practical questions: “Science is meaningless
because it gives no answer to our question, the only question that is
important to us, ‘What shall we do and how shall we live?’”22 From this
perspective, the problem, then—with a legal order that wholly assimilates
itself to bureaucratic rationality—is that such an order is systematically
blind to the most important questions of value that are inevitably
intertwined with adjudication.
At its worst, then, totalitarian regimes can exploit bureaucratic
government’s instrumental character. In those regimes, as stability
disappeared, decree followed decree in the pursuit of an ever-receding
goal ideologically determined by Nature (Nazism) or History (Stalinism).
In Arendt’s wonderful phrase, “all the laws are laws of movement.”23 In
such a world, there obviously can be no place for rights that would serve
only inappropriately to limit the most efficient achievement of those
transcendent goals—ends in comparison to which any more local
consideration melts into air.
James Landis—a towering New Dealer, Justice Felix Frankfurter’s
student and Justice Louis Brandeis’s clerk, a member of the Security and
Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and later the
Civil Aeronautics Board—was celebrating this instrumental vision,
though in a much more benign context, when he explained in the thirties
that the administrative state grew up from the perceived inadequacies of
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Marianne Constable tells the story of our current problem in jurisprudence as taking these
same steps through Kant to instrumentalism to Nietzsche. MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST
SILENCES: THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF MODERN LAW 9, 36–43 (2007).
22. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 47
(Harcourt 1976) (quoting MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 143 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills
eds., 1946)).
23. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 463 (Harcourt 1973) (1951).
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eighteenth century forms to the problems posed by the perceived need to
control the vast instrumental entities that dominated the nation’s
economic life. He said, with some satisfaction: “One of the ablest
administrators that it was my good fortune to know, I believe, never read,
at least more than casually the statutes that he translated into reality,” but
“assumed they gave him power to deal with the broad problems of an
industry and, upon that understanding, he sought his own solutions.”24
The rise of the administrative process, society’s more benign term for
bureaucracy, represented the hope that the policies to shape our economy
and society could adequately be developed by “men bred to the facts.”25
He believed that government bureaucracies that could harness the power
of disciplined instrumental rationality were necessary in a world where
private bureaucracies organized around profit maximization dominated
so much of the world’s economic and social life. Landis recognized that
the world was already a “profoundly bureaucratic society”26 and
democracy’s effective means had to include the same instrumental
rationality that prevailed in the corporate world.27
As a child of his time, Landis could assure himself that the ultimate
ends for the instrumental rationality were largely set by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s vision in the New Deal that was democratically
endorsed in his early landslide victories. Consider, by contrast, this rather
bleaker view of the current situation in 2016:
The House majority turned most of its attention from passing laws to
investigating the bureaucracy. Political division within the nation
became more bitter than usual because of unlimited anonymous
political contributions; computer-assisted redistricting to make
legislative districts safe for extremists; a 24-hour television news cycle
that instantly sensationalizes events; a profuse set of social media that
has created a free-for-all public discourse echo chamber; and
permanently unresolved hot-button issues like abortion, gay rights, gun
control, immigration, and global warming.28

A loss of faith in electoral politics as expressing democratic judgment
would run the risk that the only kind of rationality that we could deploy
24. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 217 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1977).
25. LANDIS, supra note 5, at 144. These were the “facts” largely mediated through the devices
of applied social science.
26. DAVID GRAEBER, THE UTOPIA OF RULES ON TECHNOLOGY, STUPIDITY, AND THE SECRET
JOYS OF BUREAUCRACY 13 (2015).
27. For a contemporary argument to this effect, see generally CHARLES T. GOODSELL, THE NEW
CASE FOR BUREAUCRACY (2015).
28. Id. at 182.
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publicly was instrumental rationality. And so the first concern about a
bureaucratic legal order would be that it was incapable of engaging in the
most important normative issues. It could deal only with means, never
ends, so that “means became ends.”29
A second concern with bureaucracy focuses not on its purely
instrumental character, but on its alleged penchant for the mechanical
application of rules without any concern for their purposes. Notice that
this claim is paradoxical, given the first criticism—which alleges that
bureaucracy is only concerned with the effective realization of
predetermined goals.
Notice too that the term “mechanical
jurisprudence” applied historically to an obsessive legal formalism in
legal decision making. Therefore, this penchant for purposeless rulefollowing might not serve deftly to distinguish the legal order from
(other?) bureaucracies. This charge against bureaucracy is largely the
picture of “organizational gothic” that this Essay described at the
beginning, whose greatest literary analyst was Franz Kafka.30
David Graeber has argued that the United States has been “a
profoundly bureaucratic society” for over a century.31 “If we do not
notice it, it is largely because bureaucratic practices and requirements
have become so all-pervasive that we can barely see them—or worse,
cannot imagine doing things any other way.” 32 Surprisingly, market
societies produce more rules and procedures for applying them, not
fewer.33 As Kafka understood, bureaucratic procedures have their allure:
The simplest explanation for the appeal of bureaucratic procedures lies
in their impersonality. Cold, impersonal bureaucratic relations are
much like cash transactions, and both offer similar advantages and
disadvantages. On the one hand, they are soulless. On the other, they
29. RALPH P. HUMMEL, THE BUREAUCRATIC EXPERIENCE: THE POST-MODERN CHALLENGE
89 (5th ed. 2008).
30. ROBERT P. BURNS, KAFKA’S LAW: THE TRIAL AND AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2014);
see also supra note 1 (“[O]rganizations are ‘sites of darkness’, ‘labryrinths with endless corridors’;
and ‘locked doors hiding secrets’ shifting from the ‘dark street’ to the ‘cramped office.’”).
31. GRAEBER, supra note 26, at 13.
32. Id.
33. This is consistent with Polanyi’s argument that a market society is a highly artificial
construct that requires constant maintenance through administration and undercuts the vision of the
market as purely “spontaneous ordering.” See generally THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (W.W. Norton & Co. 2009)
(proposing that classical liberalism and capitalism have died and been replaced by interest group
liberalism). Indeed, John Dewey concluded that Polanyi’s account had effectively demolished
Hayek’s argument in The Road to Serfdom (2007). ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 460–61 (1991). For a criticism of the toxic combination of neoliberal
economics and repressive penal practices, see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE
MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 191–94 (2011).
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are simple, predictable, and—within certain parameters at least—treat
everyone more or less the same.34

It was this relatively impersonal, rule-bound nature of judicial
proceedings that Hannah Arendt celebrated as placing the hedges
between men that allowed them to act freely within those bounds (“Good
fences make good neighbors!”). By contrast, totalitarian regimes, as she
put it, press men up against one another so that there is no room for
anyone to move. Graeber, however, does not want us to become too
romantic about the doings of actual bureaucracies: “Even on the lowest
levels, those who enforce the law are not really subject to it. It’s
extraordinary [sic] difficult, for instance, for a police officer to do
anything to an American citizen that would lead to that officer’s being
convicted of a crime.”35
Charles T. Goodsell has argued that bureaucracy—sometimes even its
strict Weberian sense36—can be made to serve benign purposes. Graeber
contends, however, that bureaucracy as the mechanical application of
rules is the inevitable device employed for truly malevolent purposes.
Situations created by violence—particularly structural violence, by
which I mean forms of pervasive social inequality that are ultimately
backed up by the threat of physical harm—invariably tend to create the
kinds of willful blindness we normally associate with bureaucratic
procedures. To put it crudely: it is not so much that bureaucratic
procedures are inherently stupid . . . but rather that they are invariably
ways of managing social situations that are already stupid because they
are founded on structural violence.37

Further,
Bureaucratic knowledge is all about schematization. In practice
bureaucratic procedure invariably means ignoring all the subtleties of
real social existence and reducing everything to preconceived
mechanical or statistical formulae. Whether it’s a matter of forms,
rules, statistics or questionnaires, it is always a matter of
simplification.38

William Stuntz indicts the contemporary American criminal justice
34. GRAEBER, supra note 26, at 152.
35. Id. at 195.
36. Goodsell argues that there remains a place for that kind of bureaucracy, though he seems to
see a place, in various contexts, to some democratizing and even privatizing devices. GOODSELL,
supra note 5, at 125–66.
37. GRAEBER, supra note 26, at 57.
38. Id. at 57. “[I]f one accepts Jean Piaget’s definition of mature intelligence as the ability to
coordinate between multiple perspectives (or possible perspectives), one can see, here, how
bureaucratic power, at the moment it turns to violence, becomes literally a form of infantile
stupidity.” Id. at 80–81.
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system for this reliance on complex mechanical formulae embedded in
criminal law doctrine which increasingly defines criminality in strictly
behavioral terms without any reference to contextual moral evaluation.39
These doctrinal changes support bureaucratic extraction of confessions
followed by pressure on defendants rooted in the mandatory minimum
sentences. These, in turn, support charge bargaining and the increased
discretionary maximum sentences that further enhance prosecutorial
bargaining power and so reduce the eligibility of trial and have led to
mass incarceration.40 These changes are in contrast to an earlier regime
where crimes were defined more “vaguely” and where the kind of
contextual moral evaluation that we expect from local juries occurred
regularly in the much more frequent jury trials that we conducted.41
The final consideration that suggests that we might not want our legal
order to be fully bureaucratized is Hannah Arendt’s notion of bureaucracy
as a “rule by nobody.”42 “Bureaucracy is the form of government in
which everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act; for
the rule by Nobody is not no-rule, and where all are equally powerless
we have a tyranny without a tyrant.”43 The central notion is that truly
unspeakable things are more likely to occur when no human being is held
responsible for what does occur, when human events take on a kind of
natural inevitability.44
This concern about the abdication of human responsibility in our legal
order has been expressed in different contexts. Some years ago, Joseph
Vining complained about appellate opinions written by committees of
clerks, which expressed no human voice:
Opinions now more often seem things written by no one at all. They
are long, rather too long to be written by men struggling with a vast
increase in caseload. They are too much things of patchwork, things
which seem, on their face, to express more the institutional process of
their making than the thinking, feeling, and the reasoning of author and
those persuaded with him. Poor craftsmanship, if that were the

39. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 308–09 (2011).
40. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 115 (2012).
41. STUNTZ, supra note 39, at 308–09.
42. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE (1970) (arguing that the greater the
bureaucratization of public life, the greater the draw to violence).
43. Id. at 81.
44. Kafka has a wonderful portrayal of the functionaries distributed in a warren of offices, none
of whom are responsible for what occurs, but who are only unhappy because people believe them
to be hardhearted. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 67–70 (Breon Mitchell trans., Schocken Books
1998).
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problem, can be cured by gradually replacing the authors of opinions
with better craftsmen. The writing of opinions by no one, bureaucratic
writing, is not so easy to change once it has taken hold.45

“Lawyers assume that legal writing is a means of access to the legal
mind” and oral argument is actually “a dialogue undertaken on behalf of
us all.”46 To the extent the United States Supreme Court does become a
bureaucracy, that assumption cannot be made.47
At the other end of our legal order, some criticize the ways in which
the judicial system deprives juries of the knowledge of the consequences
of their decisions—most dramatically in criminal sentencing48—and of
morally relevant aspects of the full factual narratives that bring the case
to trial.49 In both cases, and in different ways, the system deprives juries
of the means to ensure fully responsible decision making. Rules seek to
transform even the jury into a cog in a bureaucratic process.
II. ONE VISION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRACIES AND
COURTS
One common vision of the relationship between bureaucracies and
courts relies on the distinction between instrumental reason and
formalistic rule following. In this view, our bureaucracies, true to
MacIntyre’s account, are the sites—and the means—for deployment of
manipulative techniques guided by technocratic science.
By contrast, the courts provide constraints on this function by insisting
that the agencies “abide by the rules” even when that interferes with the
most effective action—the unlimited achievement of “domination
through knowledge.”50 This vision relies on a scheme that comes
45. Joseph Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH L. REV. 248, 251 (1981).
46. Id. at 253.
47. Joseph Vining, Justice and the Bureaucratization of Appellate Courts, 2 WINDSOR Y.B.
ACCESS TO JUST., 3, 9 (1982); see generally JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE
EMPIRE OF FORCE (2006) (analyzing the force behind the human language and the ethics behind
human expression within the law). See also Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary,
92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1456 (1983) (indicating that the hierarchy present in the judiciary renders the
decision or opinion as not wholly the judge’s own work).
48. See William E. Nelson, Political Decision Making by Informed Juries, 55 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1149, 1160 (2014) (arguing that it is improper to keep jurors ignorant of law and facts that
might influence their judgment).
49. See United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 493 (E.D.N.Y 1995) (demonstrating Judge
Jack Weinstein’s views on the sophistication of American juries); see also Peter W. Murphy, Some
Reflections on Evidence and Proof, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 327, 328 (1999) (arguing that it is a benign
development that we now entrust juries with more evidence and exclude less).
50. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 225
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
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naturally to the modern mind, probably because of its attachment to an
identification of rationality with a fundamentally technocratic
understanding of science, one in which science’s principle of sufficient
reason, its criteria of validity, are prediction and control. So Kant, the
paradigmatic modern philosopher, built his ethical theory around the
contrast between our natural inclination to pursue our own happiness, the
satisfaction of our (naturally determined) desires, and the limitation on
that pursuit through self-legislated rules—the various formulations of
which Kant called the Categorical Imperative. At a much more localized
level, the law of professional responsibility is built around a largely
instrumental understanding of the lawyer’s obligation to “zealously”
pursue his or her client’s ends51—as understood by the client—and the
lawyer’s constraint by specific rules that serve to limit that otherwise
generally instrumental practice—for example, rules prohibiting
misrepresentations of fact and law.52
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)—the “fierce
compromise” that emerged in partial reaction to the perceived tension
between the instrumental rationality of New Deal agencies and traditional
notions of legal rules as protective of individual rights—imposed very
limited formalisms on internal agency action.53 Under the APA,
reviewing courts were left to determine whether the agency’s final action
was “unlawful,” “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or
immunity,” “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority of limitations,”
“without observance of procedure required by the law,” or “not in
accordance with law”—all formalist criteria that require agencies to
“follow the rules laid down,” and then, somewhat more curiously for this
scheme “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.”54 The APA’s
original understanding did reflect a dichotomy between instrumental
pursuit of the ends very broadly set by legislative intent and the
constraints on that pursuit by specific legislative and constitutional
rules.55
51. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rs. 1.2, 1.3 (2012) (discussing the distribution of
authority between lawyer and client, as well as rules pertaining to diligence).
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rs. 3.3, 3.4, 4.1 (2012).
53. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558–59 (1996) (stating that the “balance that
the APA struck between promoting individuals’ rights and maintaining agencies’ policy-making
flexibility has continued in force, with only minor modifications”); see generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–
06.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
55. I am not interested here in the vast web of doctrine that surrounds these categories or the
way in which case law has rendered the neat dichotomy I am suggesting much more problematic.
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We often conceive of the relationship between our police
bureaucracies and courts in a similar way. The police, we are told, are in
the “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,” an enterprise in which
we expect bureaucratic efficiency.56 We are not surprised that they rely
on social scientific methods in their work: think of the Comstat statistical
system for deploying officers and the Reid-Inbau interrogation manuals,
which is based loosely on applied psychology and the controversial
integration of professional psychologists in military interrogation. The
courts are often viewed as imposing rule-based constraints on police
tactics, whether through the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures or through the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment’s limits on police interrogation, both through the assumed
deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule. That much of this often
Byzantine superstructure of rules and exceptions to rules is practically
irrelevant, invoking “mostly symbolic and largely ineffectual
constitutional laws”57 suggests that it says more about our thought-ways
than about our actual institutional commitments.
III. FOLLOWING RULES IN BUREAUCRACIES AND COURTS
It may be helpful at this point to distinguish explicitly in ideal-type
terms four different kinds of decision making: (1) instrumental decisions,
the choice of the most effective means to achieve predetermined ends set
by a sovereign will; (2) formalist decisions, determinations as to whether
a particular act or event (always under a description) fits within a verbal
category, a determination, as will see, has an indeterminate relationship
to the realizing of the sovereign’s goals; (3) decisions that best embody a
value, norm, standard, or ideal incompletely comprised within the strict
semantic meaning of a rule, such as constitutional decisions that reflect
one way or another a transcendent “higher law”58 or certain “purposive”
interpretations of statutes; and (4) decisions that determine practically
which relevant competing value is most important in a concrete situation
as interpreted through all the narrative and dramatic resources we can
deploy, such as those that constitute the trial.59 The first of these forms
of decision making is clearly bureaucratic. The second is likely to be
bureaucratic, though in a “legal system” formalist decision making may
56. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
57. RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 291 (2008).
58. See Edward S. Corwin, The Higher Law Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REV. 149, 153 (1928) (explaining the concept of a “higher law” as one that is derived
from a common belief that the law embedded in the Constitution is “superior to the will of human
governors”).
59. ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL passim (1999).
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take on a life of its own detached from the will of the sovereign. The
third and fourth styles of decision making are not bureaucratic at all.
Notice how this taxonomy is not, once again, congruent with the
institutional divide between agencies and courts. First, bureaucracies
may be highly rule-bound to allow the sovereign and the highest
bureaucrats the greatest control over the lower bureaucrats. Second, the
most rule-bound agencies will find themselves inevitably exercising
discretion as new situations arise. Third, courts may embrace
instrumental ideals that suppress adherence to the most obvious meanings
of rules, whether invoking a utilitarian, wealth-maximizing, or pragmatist
justification. Philosophical pragmatism provided much of the intellectual
underpinning of the Realist movement in the United States. For John
Dewey, for example, truth was achieved when the environment was
transformed to eliminate an imbalance between the needs of the human
organism and its environment, a so-called “problematic situation.”
“[S]ince the purpose of knowing is to assist in controlling the
environment, success at it (truth) is effective control.”60 A persistent
criticism of Dewey’s philosophy has been that it too uncritically
attempted to assimilate all intelligent practice to the instrumental methods
of physical science. Thus, even a sympathetic critic of Dewey’s
philosophy concludes that Dewey’s understanding of scientific method
“does not sufficiently help us to understand the crucial differences
between scientific and democratic communities, or how instrumental
rationality and scientism can deform the deliberation and judgment
required for the practice of democracy.”61 And so it is not surprising that
we find Brian Tamanaha harshly criticizing Realist courts as acting
inconsistently with the rule of law.62
So when a Realist judge decides a case, he or she seems to be acting
like a bureaucrat unburdened by a formalist understanding of the rule of
law. On the other hand, a formalist may still be a bureaucrat, albeit one
60. WILLIAM D. BLATTNER, The Primacy of Practice and Assertoric Truth: Dewey and
Heidegger, in HEIDEGGER, AUTHENTICITY AND MODERNITY 231, 239 (Mark Wrathall & Jeff
Malpass eds., 2000).
61. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES: ESSAYS IN A PRAGMATIC MODE 271
(1986).
62. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY
(2004) (discussing the concerns of Western conservatives about the decline of the rule of law and
how the radical Left promoted this decline); see also Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an Instrumental
View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 469, 504 (2007) (“In the present
atmosphere, with prevailing misunderstandings about the Realist position and about the
implications of postmodernism, judges may become convinced that to decide in a rule-bound
fashion is a chimerical or naive aspiration.”).
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that embraces, like a “rule-utilitarian,” the importance of adhering to the
semantic meaning of rules for the sake of consistency and the control of
the lower bureaucracy, in this case, the lower courts. The formalist is
simply a more Weberian bureaucrat.63 Unger described the continuity
between primitive discretionary bureaucracies and formalist courts as
such:
The administrator focuses on the most effective means to realize given
policy objectives within the constraints of the law. For him, rules of
law are a framework within which decisions are made. For the contrary,
the law passes from the periphery to the center of concern. Adjudication
calls for distinctive sorts of arguments, and its integrity demands special
institutions and personnel.64

Under the formalist vision of the rule of law, the judge becomes
somewhat detached from an immediate understanding of the will of the
sovereign and relies on adherence to the conventions of ordinary
adjudication to determine whether a particular case falls within the
authoritative verbal category, as in the second style of decision making
described above. This formalism, however, is often simply thought of as
the most appropriate method actually to affect the will of the sovereign,
because it is the statute’s language that provides the most reliable guide
to an otherwise elusive sovereign will.65 This would mean that there
might be a difference in degree between bureaucracy and court, but not
really in kind. To the extent that the canons of statutory interpretation are
rules of thumb—and given their internal tension that’s all they could be—
courts again come to resemble bureaucracies more closely. This is
especially true for courts enforcing the open-ended statutes that often
form the organic statutes under which agencies operate.
IV. IS THE LEGAL ORDER ANYTHING OTHER THAN A SOMETIMES
STYLIZED BUREAUCRACY FOR EFFICIENTLY ACHIEVING THE WILL OF THE
SOVEREIGN?
Jerry Mashaw similarly characterizes “bureaucratic rationality,”
specifically in the context of administrative adjudication, as the
identification of the most efficient means to achieve the goals of a
predetermined legislative will.66 In the program he studies, the Social

63. See supra Part I (discussing the issues a bureaucracy creates).
64. UNGER, supra note 13, at 177.
65. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI L. REV. 533, 547 (1983)
(explaining that “because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have ‘intents’ or
‘designs,’ hidden yet discoverable. . . . The body as a whole, however, has only outcomes”).
66. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS 25–26 (1985).
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Security Disability Program, he takes that will to be an Austinian
command: pay Social Security Disability Benefits only to those eligible
as determined by the statutory criteria. Thus factual accuracy and fairness
of statutory fit are the bureaucrat’s goal and thus the appropriate approach
is “technocratic,” in that it seeks the “least cost methodology” for
assembling the relevant facts and making the dispositive categorization.
By contrast, as he puts it, questions of “value or preference” are
“obviously irrelevant to the administrative task, and it would view
reliance on nonreplicable, nonreviewable judgment or intuition as a
singularly unattractive methodology for decision.”67 After all, the
legislature should have resolved all the value questions, in the Weberian
framework, by an act of subjective will. In this context, bureaucratic
determinations involve “information retrieval and processing” in a way
Weber would recognize.”68 After all, “bureaucratic administration
means fundamentally domination through knowledge” through the “usual
bureaucratic routines.”69
Mashaw distinguishes bureaucratic rationality from the “moral
judgment model” whose natural home he finds in traditional
understandings of common law adjudication, something which will be
discussed shortly.70 But he also argues that some administrative agencies
have embraced not bureaucratic rationality, but a moral judgment model
in developing norms in case-by-case adjudication that we might think
continuous with civil or criminal adjudication.71 The moral judgment
model is one that centrally defines rights and determines which
competing claim is the more deserving. It is not the importance or
unimportance of rules that distinguishes bureaucratic from traditional
adjudication, as Tamanaha seems to suggest,72 but rather it is the way in
which the process of adjudication is or is not “value-defining” where “the
question is not just who did what, but who is to be preferred, all things
considered, when interests and the values to which they can be relevantly
connected conflict . . . so the criminal trial is interested not just in guilt,
but in guiltiness.”73
Mashaw concludes that “a contextualized
exploration of individual deservingness” has procedural implications that
67. Id. at 26.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 29.
71. Id. at 30–33.
72. See supra text accompanying note 62 (discussing Tamanaha’s views on the short comings
of the Realist court and the inconsistent manner in which they act).
73. MASHAW, supra note 66, at 29–30.
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connect up with many of our usual procedural commitments to due
process, as expressions of what H.L.A. Hart called the first principle of
procedural justice: “Let the other side be heard.”74
Notice again how the divide between bureaucracy and legal judgment
does not track the dichotomy between agency and the legal system. The
Supreme Court in SEC v. Chenery Corp. held, over vigorous dissents,
that agencies had virtually the same authority as did courts to develop and
refine the norms by which they passed judgment on private behavior.75
This was true, the Court ruled, even if the “new rule” was declared in a
case of first impression within the agency and had legal consequences for
past behavior.76 This value-defining enterprise cannot be the province of
“rule by nobody.”77 It requires more of the decision maker than does
bureaucratic decision making of either the discretionary or rule-bound
variety. The manner of “playing by the rules”—even to the extent that it
is possible—means screening out the features of a concrete situation that
common sense morality says is relevant to the decision. Here, for
example, is Kalven and Zeisel’s list of the considerations that juries have
found relevant though not envisioned by the law of rules: that the
defendant was seriously injured at the time of the crime, or that the victim
is not enthusiastic about proceeding, or that the defendant’s behavior is
rarely prosecuted, or would not be illegal across the river in the next state,
or that the defendant was not represented by counsel, or that he was
suffering horrendous personal tragedies during the time he (even
“knowingly”) failed to file an income tax return, or that the defendant
used a toy gun rather than a real gun in an armed robbery.78 In each case,
the jury was willing to allow the factual context to “talk back” to a law of
rules that demanded bureaucratic enforcement. The jury was able in each
case to honor aspects of the situation that the trial’s devices disclosed79
in a manner examined in the next Part.

74. Id. at 29–31.
75. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (holding that administrative judgments
are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts, as they are the “product of
administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the
statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts”). This case is also referred
to as Chenery II, because it was the second time it reached the Supreme Court.
76. Id. at 203.
77. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 38 (1970) (defining the rule by nobody as
bureaucracy or the rule of an elaborate system of bureaus in which no men can be held responsible).
78. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 293, 338 (1966).
79. On truth as disclosure, see generally JAMES J. DICENSO, HERMENEUTICS AND THE
DISCLOSURE OF TRUTH: A STUDY IN THE WORK OF HEIDEGGER, GADAMER, AND RICOEUR (1990).
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V. ARE THERE ASPECTS OF OUR LEGAL ORDER THAT ARE NOT
BUREAUCRATIC?
The contemporary American trial cannot be called a bureaucratic
institution. This is precisely why it is under pressure.80 There are fewer
trials because of the triumph of plea bargaining, the doctrinal dominance
of microeconomic analysis in antitrust, the rise of economic theories of
tort law, the embrace of “objective” doctrines of qualified immunity in
civil rights law that can be adjudicated on summary judgment and subject
to interlocutory appeals that prevent trials (indeed some of which
recognize a “right not to stand trial”),81 and easier access to summary
disposition on motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.
Many developments move the legal order in a bureaucratic direction: the
marginalization of the full narrative dramatic of the trial, the elevation of
a mechanical practice of rule following, and the assimilation of legal
decision making to expert economic determinations. They ensure that
there will be fewer cases that turn on the significance of specific factual
contexts and on the responsible engagement of decision makers.
Trials begin with opening statements. Opening statements allow
counsel to tell the jury “what the case is about.” They allow the individual
parties largely to define both the factual and normative issues that the
case presents. The relatively free narrative of opening statements allows
counsel to invoke the full range of life-world norms that are embedded in
the common sense of the jury, simply by telling an engaging story. Of
course the story is constrained by the rest of the trial, which effectively
requires counsel to “keep his promise” to offer evidence that actually
supports the narrative presented. Most of the evidence at trial is presented
through the disciplined narratives of direct examination, limited to “the
language of perception” and so, in its concreteness, offering a critique of
the broader and more comprehensive narratives presented in openings. 82
Each direct examination is followed by cross examination. The cross
examination performs a number of different functions: it can point out
the details omitted from the direct that may change the significance of the
narrative; it can suggest that the ordering or characterization of the
episodes in the direct’s narratives emerge from a willful interpretation of
a relatively indefinite set of perceptions; it can offer a full “counternarrative” of the events; and it can suggest that the witness’s account is
the result of a range of failings from over-casualness to negligence to
80. ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 110–11 (1999).
81. See generally Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994) (explaining
the small subset of cases where a right not to stand trial will justify an interlocutory appeal).
82. ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL, 130–31 (1999).
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deliberate misstatement.
The defendant’s case in chief follows the plaintiff’s case in chief, the
plaintiff’s rebuttal case follows the defendant’s rebuttal case, and
sometimes the defendant’s surrebuttal follows the plaintiff’s
surrebuttal—a dialectic that allows the jury to see the case from every
available perspective. The doctrine of materiality keeps the inquiry
loosely tethered to the norms embedded in the substantive law and the
requirement of testimony based on personal knowledge in the relatively
value-free language of perception allows for the reinterpretation of events
from the multiple perspectives that the trial itself creates. The
requirement of foundations for all testimony assures that the question,
“why do you believe this is true?,” be answered before any particular bit
of testimony is offered. These are all clarifying “parliamentary” devices,
not hyper-technical requirements.83
In sum, a well-tried case can actualize a usually dormant, but extremely
powerful democratic, common sense in order to achieve real insight into
the persons and events being tried. The trial allows for a simultaneous
grasp of facts, norms, and possibilities for judgment that its methods
provide. It is an extremely refined and complex institution that embodies
a set of conservative practices that is suited to our contemporary needs.
It proceeds by the construction and deconstruction of different sorts of
narratives thrown into dramatic confrontation. The opening statements,
for example, allow the jury to contemplate the competing “as-structures”
of the two cases (i.e., as a broken promise, as an act of disloyalty, or as
an innocent misunderstanding). This provides the wherewithal to
determine what the case means and what its dominant significance is in
the common world within which it is placed. Direct examination allows
the jury to evaluate the adequacy of the evidence supporting competing
significances and cross examination allows the jury to see the inevitable
willfulness that inheres even in apparently chaste descriptions of events.
These devices refine and elevate common sense judgment well beyond
its quotidian version largely created by the mass media. Because the trial
respects the conflicting values embedded in the two cases, it really can
serve as the crucible of democracy.
Triable cases always present conflicting values. The “law of rules”
may pull in one direction. After all, rules provide stability and some
measure of predictability. They make planning possible and protect us
against the arbitrary use of power. In a liberal democracy, they should
usually express the democratic will of the people. But common sense
83. For an explanation of the distinction, see Robert P. Burns, The Withering Away of Evidence
Law: Notes on Theory and Practice, 47 GA. L. REV. 691, 694 (2013).
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morality may pull in another direction. More controversially—though
certainly rooted in our history—the jury may take on an overtly political
role and “send a message” to discourage abuses of power.
The trial’s fierce oppositions—embedded in differences in role and
language—create almost unbearable tensions, the resolution of which, in
modern society, actually constitutes justice.84 This can occur if the
juror’s mind dwells85 in the tensions that allow for insight into the poles
of the conflict, a kind of grasp or integration that cannot be reduced to
representation, definitions, and inferences that bureaucratic decision
making depends on, but rather requires a largely tacit grasp of a situation
as a whole.
The trial is, in a word, dramatic.86 It is essentially dialogic and allows
for the interaction of relatively autonomous actors. It is not only recited,
but performed. In good drama, this interaction of free agents is not simply
a movement, but a revelation. It grants us “an insight, however limited,
into the worlds that exist within horizons of meaning, within which a
complex action unfolds, illuminated and judged by it.”87 Dramatic forms
keep us in the middle of things. As in drama, the result of a trial may be
“both fittingness of surprise,” unlike what can be derived from the
“semantic content of rules.” The decision makers at trial, to the extent
that they allow themselves to be affected by its drama, may lose their
ability to act in a purely instrumental manner.
Some of our limited understanding of law as a set of rules may come
from our usual academic focus on the products of the appellate courts.
Most lawmaking, in Mashaw’s sense of value defining,88 occurs in the
trial court through practices that are much more complex than simple
rule-following. This will continue to be true unless, of course, either
intentionally or acceding to glacial economic and social forces, we allow
trials to disappear or reduce them to lower-level appellate courts, and in
our terms, bureaucracies, by funneling decision making into their
response to dispositive motions “on the papers.” Judge Patricia Wald
84. See HAMPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 22 (noting that conflict, both social and psychological,
plays its own role in creating a harmony that defines social justice).
85. MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY
332–34 (1958).
86. I follow DAVID C. SCHINDLER, HANS URS VON BALTHASAR AND THE DRAMATIC
STRUCTURE OF TRUTH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION (2004).
87. Id. at 17–18 (quoting HANS URS VON BALTHASAR, THEO-DRAMA: THEOLOGICAL
DRAMATIC THEORY, VOL. 1: PROLEGOMENA 265 (Graham Harrison trans., Ignatius 1988)).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 66–74 (arguing that the justice system has gradually
moved away from trials, in favor of bureaucratic resolutions. This doctrinal dominance comes at
the expense of the common sense morality that accompanies the inherently dramatic trial).
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warned years ago against the impoverishment of law even at the appellate
level where appellate judges write the opinions without the benefit of
what “the discipline of the evidence”89 at trial has revealed.90
So the contemporary American trial, even though under siege,
provides an aspect of our legal order that cannot fairly be called
bureaucratic. It encourages neither instrumental decision making nor the
mechanical application of rules. What about appellate decision making?
Does it offer a forum for decision making that cannot fairly be called
bureaucratic?
As mentioned above, some years ago Joseph Vining decried the
bureaucratization of appellate decision making:91 “The courts are among
the last of the great voices to be rationalized, detached from substance
and reduced to process, as a result of that pursuit of objectivity outside
ourselves which has produced both the radical individualism and the
impersonal bureaucracy we know today.”92 He hoped that the full
“bureaucratization of courts may not come to pass” and that we opt for
the authoritative over the authoritarian.93 To this end, he hinted vaguely
that we should look “anew at the connections and distinctions between
lawyers and the practitioners of other disciplines, not just the social
sciences to which we have recently attended.”94 His suggestion, in some
ways reminiscent of MacIntyre’s views, is that many of the social
sciences themselves embody the forms of instrumentalism that are
characteristic of our bureaucratic and individualistic era.
Vining is not alone in suggesting that we need the humanistic
disciplines even to see those aspects of the modern legal order that are
not bureaucratic. Frederick Schauer has recently offered one distinctively
modern account of the legal order, defending a version of the legal order
that he calls “presumptive positivism” (i.e., that contemporary law,
understood though the lens of the social sciences, really is embedded in
rules that courts can and do presumptively follow).95 These rules have
no intrinsic connection with justice. They “entrench the past” and “serve
89. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY
162 (1994).
90. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1943 (1998).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 45–47 (describing the increasingly bureaucratic
tendencies of the courts to be a product of a necessity for bureaucratic efficiency in law
enforcement).
92. Vining, supra note 47, at 15.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. FREDERICK SCHAUER, RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 196–206 (1991).
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the goals of stability for stability’s sake.”96
Writing from a distinctively humanistic97 perspective, Marianne
Constable suggests that the identification of law with systems of rules,
even those that realistically can be “followed,” misses what is most
important about law—its constitutive connection with justice.98 “The
tradition of jurisprudence treats the issue of how reasons for action
become reasons to act as central. . . . [H]ence presumptive positivism fails
to provide an account of what is distinctive to law as a normative and
social system, beyond the social convention of calling it ‘law.’”99
Constable argues that Schaur’s picture of the contemporary legal system
understands rules as the results of social processes understood through
the lens of the social sciences.100 His presumptive positivism locates the
source of motivation for decision in empirically knowable aspects of
society and its norms, understood as a kind of fact. Further, Constable
contends that “[i]n so doing presumptive positivism minimizes the place
of human agency and freedom in initiating action and sets aside the
possibility that a decision, as the action and responsibility of an actor
rather than the outcome of a rule may instantiate ‘law.’” To put it in
Arendt’s terms, law, as opposed to bureaucracy, cannot be “rule by
nobody.”101 Constable argues that even today there is more to law:
In modern legal texts and practices are to be found not only
presumptively positivist pedigreed “rule-formulations” and decisions
grounded in rules and overriding social factors, however. In modern
legal texts and practices are to be found judgments of responsibility and
invocations of justice. Invocations of justice—which may not be
explicitly stated, much less take propositional or even meaningful
semantic form—are not at all acknowledged in Schauer’s account of
rules and social norms. Yet these invocations reveal the distinctiveness
of law.102

The place of rules in a legal order depends on larger considerations.
“Stability for stability’s sake, unwillingness to trust decision-makers to
depart too drastically from the past, and a conservatism committed to the
view that changes from the past are more likely to be for the worse than

96. Id. at 155–58.
97. She characteristically calls her perspective “rhetorical.” CONSTABLE, supra note 21, at 8–
11. It seems that Heidegger, especially the later Heidegger, is her most powerful influence.
98. Id. at 8.
99. Id. at 74.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 69–70.
102. Id.
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for the better.”103 And so the ultimate determination on the place and
manner of rule-following in adjudication must be a matter of a
responsible judgment: “Whether the favoring of the status quo over the
new and stability for stability’s sake is judged a worthwhile goal is again
not a matter of rules. It depends instead on a ‘substantive conception of
where we are, and where we want to be.’”104
Constable thus concludes that justice can only exist in the “silence[s]
of modern law,” not in its rules, but rather in the ability of legal
proceedings to disclose a range of the aspects of a situation relevant to a
just outcome even if not encompassed by the “semantic meaning” of a
rule.105 The possibilities for “justice and law” only “occur in glimpsing
what lies behind the rules, ‘the poem behind the poem,’” the reality that
can only show itself in the law’s practices, usually unveiled by the
humanistic disciplines, not the positivist social sciences.106
James Boyd White has for many decades looked to the humanistic
disciplines to provide an account of law that is not bureaucratic. Focusing
mainly on the work of the appellate courts, he has argued that law “is not
at heart an abstract system or scheme of rules” nor a set of institutions
describable in the language of social science, but “an inherently unstable
structure of thought and expression, built upon a distinct set of dynamic
and dialogic tensions. It is not a set of rules at all, but a form of life. It
is a process by which the old is made new, over and over again.” 107 Law
is, then, “an activity of mind and language: a kind of translation, a way
of claiming meaning for experience and making that meaning real.”108 In
a hearing, “the central institution of law as we know it,”
everyone got his or her opportunity to present the case in the best way
possible, and to answer what was said on the other side. In a legal
hearing, one could say whatever it was necessary or crucial to say about
this injury, this divorce, this failed agreement, this event in the real
world.109

When this joint performance works well—as of course it does not
always do—it subjects the material of the law, and the facts too, to the
most intense and searching scrutiny. Instead of seeking the single

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 71.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 178.
James Boyd White, An Old-Fashioned View of the Nature of Law, 12 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 381, 382 (2011).
108. Id. at 386.
109. Id. at 385.
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meaning of the statutes, judicial opinions, regulations, and other materials
of authority, the two lawyers together are demonstrating the range of
possible meanings that these texts may be given, and using all available
powers to do so.
The two sets of arguments, in making explicit the range of possible
choices open to the judge, make clear that the judge will have to make his
or her choice and have to accept responsibility for it—not push the
decision off on a statute or other text that is read in a conclusory or
unthinking way.110
The resolution of the tensions created by the lawyer’s arguments
“cannot be achieved simply by reference to a rule or practice or phrase or
idea, but must be achieved afresh, in every case, by an art of judgment.
This very fact gives life to the law.”111 The discipline of legal
argumentation is, however, only part of the story:
A part of [the judge’s] mind will think in terms of legal arguments of
the kind we have been discussing, testing them against each other for
their force and power. But beneath that layer of the mind is another, an
intuitive center, educated by experience and reflection, that is really
seeking the right decision. The judge knows that her written opinion
can never express or justify what the center of herself is doing, the secret
spring of judgment at her core. This tension cannot be resolved in any
a prior way by a rule or principle, but must, like the others mentioned,
be lived through in detail and addressed anew every time.112
The opinion therefore, however honestly written, has some of the
characteristics of a false pretense: This is why I decided the case as I
did, the opinion says; but the judge knows that the true springs of
decision are deep within her, and can never be fully known or explained.
This is another tension inherent in the legal process.113

Even a (perhaps former) rationalist with great sympathy for scientific
modes of thought such as Judge Richard Posner, writing in a very
different idiom, says something similar. He contends that at the appellate
level below the Supreme Court, where the facts have already been
determined either by the methods of the trial described above or more
peremptorily in a dispositive motion, “most cases can be and are decided
by a straight-forward application of unchallengeable legal rules.”114 Still,

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
(2016).

Id. at 391–93.
Id. at 394.
Id.
Id. at 394 n.13.
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he says this about the decisional philosophy he generally embraces:
Judicial pragmatism at its narrowest sense would equate to cost-benefit
analysis, but it is not exhausted by that or any other economic concept.
The balancing done by judges faced with having to decide a case in
what I’ve called the “open area” is often . . . inflected by “the personal,
the emotional, and the intuitive.” It is not measurement, this
“balancing,” but . . . “moral intuition.” Few judges are willing to
acknowledge that it influences any of their decisions. Many are
unaware that it does.115

This Essay suggests that a fair attempt to give an account of what
“moral intuition” involves would bring one into the sphere that White
describes and that Arendt called “reflective judgment.” This occurs
within a community of judgment where
I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different
viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who
are absent . . . . The more people’s standpoints I have present in my
mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine
how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be
my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final
conclusions, my opinion.116

Judgment’s impartiality comes from “enlarging” its understanding in a
distinctive manner:
The greater the reach—the larger the realm in which the enlightened
individual is able to move from standpoint to standpoint—the more
‘general’ will be his thinking. This generality, however, is not the
generality of the concept . . . . It is, on the contrary, closely connected
with particulars, with the particular conditions of the standpoints one
has to go through in order to arrive at one’s own general standpoint.117

Unger ends his study with these words:
The search for this latent and living law—not the law of prescriptive
rules or of bureaucratic policies, but the elementary code of human
interaction—has been the staple of the lawyer’s art whenever this art
was practiced with the most depth and skill. What united the great
Islamic “ulama,” the Roman jurisconsults, and the English common
lawyers was the sense they shared that the law, rather than being made
chiefly by judges and princes, was already present in society itself.
Throughout history there has been a bond between the legal profession
and the search for an order inherent in social life. The existence of this

115. Id. at 180–81.
116. HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES IN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 241 (1977).
117. HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 44 (1989).
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bond suggests that the lawyer’s insight, preceded the advent of the legal
order, can survive its decline.118

This spirit survives in our legal order, more in the legal practice than
in the popular political culture (decisions as “calling balls and strikes”)
and some doctrinal elaborations. Consider Linda Meyer’s description of
a good judge, one that is derived from observation as well as imagination:
[A] thoughtful judge is one who listens (a court proceeding is called a
“hearing,” after all), who responds to possibilities opened up by past
practices, who is more silent than loquacious, who is focused on the
case, who is humble, and who is not trying to apply any theory of
adjudication, grind any political axes, or control the future. The
thoughtful judge, like the thoughtful draftsman, looks for the shapes of
justice that are slumbering in the case.119

Or, as Unger put it, lawyers have always represented the idea that there
were in our practices implicit ideals—customary law if you will—that
could be raised to the level of explicitness and extended to new issues.120
Finally, the legitimacy of a legal order that is not bureaucratic depends
on the ability of legal proceedings to actualize a common sense that
actually is common. Some “natural law” theories have tried to give an
account of such a common sense. It may be that in a “post-modern” era,
however, our courts’ task will be “less to create constantly new forms of
life than to creatively renew actual forms by taking advantage of their
internal multiplicity and tensions and their friction with one another.”121
Of course, we do not need to await a philosophical justification for a nonbureaucratic legal order before we cultivate one. The theoretical
justification for a non-bureaucratic order would have to rely on a critique
of instrumental reason itself, the notion that a purely instrumental stance
“cuts us off from the world, from nature, from society, even from our own
emotional nature.”122 And it would have to elaborate a plausible form of
contemporary realism, such as the ones Taylor describes in the essay cited
and in his other work.123 Our practical issue is whether such a normative
perspective can survive and flourish in a bureaucratic legal culture that
has so pervasively embraced an instrumental rationality. Perhaps it will
continue to exist only in small, though, I believe, innumerable, small
118. UNGER, supra note 13, at 242.
119. Linda Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Mindless?, 86 GEO. L.J. 647, 665 (1998).
120. UNGER, supra note 13, at 242–45.
121. DAVID KOLB, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE MODERNITY: HEGEL, HEIDEGGER, AND AFTER
259 (1986).
122. Charles Taylor, Retrieving Realism, in MIND, REASON, AND BEING-IN-THE-WORLD: THE
MCDOWELL-DREYFUS DEBATE 61, 79 (Joseph K. Schear ed., 2013).
123. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY
(1992).
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oases in the larger bureaucratized world. For that, I suppose, we should
be grateful.

